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A key economic  issue  is whether  poor  countries  or regions  tend  to 
grow  faster  than  rich ones:  are there  automatic  forces  that lead  to 
convergence  over  time in the levels of per capita income  and prod- 
uct? We use the neoclassical  growth  model  as a framework  to study 
convergence  across  the  48  contiguous  U.S.  states. We exploit  data 
on  personal  income  since  1840  and  on  gross  state  product  since 
1963.  The  U.S.  states  provide  clear  evidence  of  convergence,  but 
the  findings  can  be  reconciled  quantitatively  with  the  neoclassical 
model  only  if diminishing  returns  to capital set in very slowly. The 
results  for  per  capita gross domestic  product  from  a broad  sample 
of  countries  are  similar  if  we  hold  constant  a set of  variables  that 
proxy  for differences  in steady-state  characteristics. 
A  key  economic  issue  is  whether  poor  countries  or  regions  tend  to 
grow  faster  than  rich  ones:  are  there  automatic  forces  that  lead  to 
convergence  over  time  in the  levels  of  per  capita  income  and  product? 
We  use  the  neoclassical  growth  model  as  a framework  to  study  con- 
vergence  across  the  48  contiguous  U.S.  states.  We  exploit  data  on 
personal  income  since  1840  and  on  gross  state  product  since  1963. 
For  studying  the  determinants  of  economic  growth,  the  experience 
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of the U.S. states represents  a vastly underutilized  resource:  in effect, 
we have over a century  of data on 48 economies  (although  surely not 
48 closed  economies!). 
The  U.S.  states provide  clear evidence  of convergence  in the sense 
that poor  economies  tend  to grow faster than rich ones  in per capita 
terms. The  estimated  speed  of convergence  accords with the neoclas- 
sical growth model  if we take a broad view of capital so that diminish- 
ing returns  to capital set in slowly as an economy  develops.  The  find- 
ings for the U.S.  states can be reconciled  with those  for a broad cross 
section  of  countries  if  we  allow  for  a notion  of  conditional  conver- 
gence  in the underlying  growth  model.  Some  puzzles arise, however, 
in reconciling  the  data with open-economy  extensions  of  the model. 
In particular, the rates of convergence  found  for income and product 
across the  U.S.  states are similar, whereas  theoretical  reasoning  sug- 
gests some  important  differences. 
Convergence  in  the  Neoclassical  Growth  Model 
In neoclassical  growth  models  for closed  economies,  as presented  by 
Ramsey (1928),  Solow (1956),  Cass (1965),  and Koopmans  (1965),  the 
per  capita  growth  rate  tends  to  be  inversely  related  to  the  starting 
level of output  or income  per person.  In particular, if economies  are 
similar  in  respect  to  preferences  and  technology,  then  poor  econo- 
mies grow  faster than rich ones.  Thus  there is a force  that promotes 
convergence  in  levels  of  per  capita  product  and  income.  Since  the 
model  is familiar,  we provide  only a brief  sketch. 
The  production  function  in intensive  form  is 
11~~~~~~~~~1  9  f(k),  (1) 
where y and k are output  and capital per unit of effective  labor, Lext, 
L is labor  (and  population),  and  x is the  rate  of  exogenous,  labor- 
augmenting  technological  progress.  (We assume  the usual curvature 
properties  for  the  production  function.)  In  a  closed  economy,  k 
evolves  as 
k =f(k)  -  c^-(8  + x +  n)k,  (2) 
where  c^  =  C/Lext,  8  is the  rate of  depreciation,  and  n is the  growth 
rate of L. The  representative,  infinite-horizon  household  maximizes 
utility, 
U =  1  u(c) ente-Ptdt,  (3) 
where  c  =  CIL, p is the rate of  time preference,  and 
uc  C  -  1 
U  W  =  1-  '  (4) CONVERGENCE  225 
with  0 >  0,  so  that marginal  utility, u'(c), has the  constant  elasticity 
-0  with respect  to c. (We assume  p >  n  +  [1  -  0]x  below  to satisfy 
the transversality condition.) 
The  first-order  condition  for  maximizing  U in equation  (3) entails 
l[f  '(k)  -  8 -p].  (5) 
In the steady state, the effective  quantities, 9, k, and c',  do not change 
and the per capita quantities, y, k,  and c, grow at the rate x. The  level 
of k in the  steady  state satisfies 
f'(k*)  =  8  +  p +  Ox.  (6) 
If the economy  starts with k below k*, then the usual analysis shows 
that k monotonically  approaches  k* (see, e.g.,  Blanchard  and Fischer 
1989, chap.  2). We have shown  (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991b, chap. 
1) that the growth  rate of capital per worker, k/k, declines  monotoni- 
cally toward  the  steady-state  value, x. This  property  carries over  un- 
ambiguously  to the growth  rate of output  per worker, 5/y, if the pro- 
duction  function  is Cobb-Douglas,  that is, if 
=  f(k)  = Aka,  (7) 
where  0  <  a  <  1. Thus  if two economies  have  the same parameters 
of preferences  and technology,  then the key result is that the initially 
poorer  economy-with  a lower  starting  value  of  k-tends  to  grow 
faster in per capita terms. 
The  transitional  dynamics  can be quantified  by using  a log linear- 
ization of equations  (2) and  (5) around  the steady state. The  solution 
for log[9(t)]  in the  log-linearized  approximation  to the model  with a 
Cobb-Douglas  technology  is 
log[9(t)]  =  log[ 9(0)]  *  e-t  +  log(^*) *  (1  -  COs  (8) 
where  the  positive  parameter  13,  which  governs  the  speed  of  adjust- 
ment  to the steady  state, is given  by the formula 
21  =  2  +  4(1  x)(P  +  8  +  Ox) 
P  +  8  +  Ox  ~  1/2  (9) 
X [+  +OX(n  +  +  x)]  a 
where  j,  p -  n -  (1  -  O)x >  0. 
The  average  growth  rate of y over the interval between  dates 0 and 
T is 
1~  ~~~~()  I  SC 
*  log [  ]  = x +  1-e  *log [Y  ]  (10) 
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The  higher  A, the  greater  the  responsiveness  of  the average  growth 
rate to the gap between  log('*)  and log[ y(0)],  that is, the more  rapid 
the  convergence  to  the  steady  state.  The  model  implies  conditional 
convergence  in that,  for  given  x and 9*, the growth  rate is higher  the 
lower y(0). The  convergence  is conditional  in that y(0) enters  in rela- 
tion to 9* and x, which may differ  across economies.  In cross-country 
regressions,  it is crucial,  but difficult,  to hold  fixed  the  variations  in 
9* and  x  in  order  to  estimate  P3.  One  advantage  of  the  U.S.  state 
context  is that the  differences  in 5* and x are likely to be minor,  so 
that conditional  and absolute convergence  need  not be distinguished. 
Because  the  crucial  element  for  convergence  in  the  neoclassical 
model  is diminishing  returns  to capital, the extent  of these  diminish- 
ing returns-that  is, the size of the capital-share coefficient  a(  in equa- 
tion (7)-has  a strong effect  on P3.  To assess the relation quantitatively 
we use a set of baseline  values for the other  parameters:  p =  .05 per 
year, 8  =  .05 per year, n  =  .02 per year, x  =  .02 per year, and 0 = 
1 (log utility). The  value n  =  .02 per year is the average of population 
growth for the United  States over the long history. The other baseline 
parameters  come  from  estimates  reported  in  Jorgenson  and  Yun 
(1986,  1990).  If we assume  a( =  .35-a  capital share appropriate  to 
a narrow concept  of physical capital (see, e.g.,  Maddison  1987)-then 
equation  (9) implies  P3  =  .126  per year, which corresponds  to a half- 
life  for  the log  of  output  per  effective  worker of  5.5 years. For ax = 
.80,  which  might  apply  if  capital  is  interpreted  broadly  to  include 
human  capital,  the value  P3  =  .026  per year implies  a half-life  of  27 
years.  As  at approaches  unity,  diminishing  returns  to capital  disap- 
pear,  P3  tends  to zero,  and  the half-life  tends  to infinity. 
The  effects  of the other  parameters  have been explored  by Cham- 
ley  (1981)  and  King  and  Rebelo  (1989).'  Quantitatively,  the  most 
important  effect  is that a lower  0 (increased  willingness  to substitute 
intertemporally)  raises  P3.  Another  result  is that the  parameter  A in 
equation  (7)  does  not  affect  P3.  Thus  the  convergence  coefficient  P3 
can  be  similar  across  economies  that  differ  greatly  in  levels  of  per 
capita  product  because  of  differences  in the  available technique  (or 
in  government  policies  or  natural  resources  that amount  to  differ- 
ences  in the  parameter  A). 
The  main  result  for  the  subsequent  analysis  is  that  the  baseline 
specification-including  at =  .35-generates  a short  half-life  and  a 
rapid speed of adjustment.  The  speeds of adjustment that we estimate 
empirically  are  much  slower:  ,  is  in  the  neighborhood  of  .02  per 
year. The  theory conforms  to the empirical findings only if we assume 
parameter  values  that  depart  substantially  from  the  baseline  case. 
1 Sato (1966)  presents  a related  analysis for a model  with a constant  saving rate. CONVERGENCE  227 
One possibility is a value of ax  around  .8, that is, in the range in which 
the  broad  nature  of  capital  implies  that  diminishing  returns  set  in 
slowly.  We  can  reduce  the  required  value  of  cat  to  around  .5  if  we 
assume  very high  values  of  0 (in excess  of  10) and a value of  8 close 
to zero. 
Setup  of  the  Empirical  Analysis 
Consider  a version  of  equation  (10) that applies  for discrete  periods 
to economy  i and  is augmented  to include  a random  disturbance: 
log  aYz(I  -te  -N)  log(y  t  )-  (t-  1)] +  i  (11) 
where 
a. 
= 
x. 
+  (1  -  e-O)log(fin,  and  ui  is  a  disturbance  term. 
Although  the  coefficient  ,3 can  vary  across  economies,  we  neglect 
these  differences  in our  analysis. This  assumption  is tenable  for the 
U.S.  states, which  are likely to be similar in terms of  the underlying 
parameters  of  technology  and  preferences.  Also,  as mentioned  be- 
fore,  the theory  implies  that pure  differences  in the level of technol- 
ogy  do  not  affect  P3.  Thus  1P  can  be  similar  for  economies  that  are 
very different  in other  respects. 
In the application  to the U.S.  states, we assume  that the coefficient 
a, in  equation  (11)  is the  same  for  all i; that is, we assume  that  the 
steady-state  value,  fi*  and  the  rate  of  technological  progress,  xi, do 
not  differ  across states.  The  time  trend,  x, .  (t  -  1), is then  also the 
same for all i. The  conditions  a,  =  a and x,  =  x in equation  (11) imply 
that  poor  economies  tend  to  grow  unconditionally  faster  than  rich 
ones  if P >  0. Because  the coefficient  on log(y,,t-1)  is  1  -  em, which 
is between  zero  and  one,  the  convergence  is not  strong  enough  to 
eliminate  the  positive  serial  correlation  in  log(yit). Put alternatively, 
in the  absence  of  random  shocks,  convergence  to the  steady  state is 
direct and involves  no oscillations.  This  property  reflects the absence 
of overshooting  in the  neoclassical  growth  model. 
Convergence  in the sense  that poor  economies  tend  to grow faster 
than rich ones,  which corresponds  to P >  0 if ai and xi are the same 
for  all i in  equation  (11),  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  cross- 
economy  dispersion  of log(yit) declines  over  time. The  effect  from P3 
>  0,  which  tends  to reduce  dispersion,  is offset  by random  shocks, 
u  it, which  tend  to raise dispersion.  If uit has zero mean  and variance 
ar and is distributed  independently  over time and across economies, 
then  the cross-economy  variance of log(yit), denoted  a 2, evolves  as 
a2  =  (e -20)o-2_  1  +  o32  (12) 228  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
which implies 
2  =  U  _  +  -  ____ 
art  1  Oro2  1  e-e2  1  (13) 
(We assume  here  that  the  cross  section  is large  enough  so  that  the 
sample  variance  of  log[yit] corresponds  to  the  population  variance, 
(rt2.)  Equation  (13)  implies  that  (y2  monotonically  approaches  the 
steady-state value, or2 =  a2/(  -  e -2*),  which rises with o2 but declines 
with  P3.  The  variance  orQ2  falls  (or rises) over  time  if  the  initial value 
a 2  is  greater  than (or less than) or2. Thus  a positive coefficient  P3  does 
not ensure  a falling  or  2. 
Shocks that have common  influences  on subgroups  of countries  or 
regions,  such as-  harvest failures and oil shocks, imply that ud in equa- 
tion  (11)  would'not  be  independent  of  ujt for j  1  i. An  important 
example  of  this  kind  of  shock  from  U.S.  history  is  the  Civil War, 
which  had  a strong  adverse  effect  on  the  southern  states relative  to 
the  northern  states.  We can handle  this type  of  situation  by writing 
the error term,  uit,  in equation  (11) as the sum of an aggregate  influ- 
ence  and  an independent  disturbance: 
log 
(  )=  a-  (1 -  e  ) *  [log(yit-,) 
Y~~~~~,t  ~~~~~~(14) 
-x*  (t -  1)]  +  4dist  +  Vit, 
where  st is an  aggregate  shock,  which  has  zero  mean  and  variance 
2  , and  4X  measures  the  effect  of  the  aggregate  disturbance  on  the 
growth  rate  of  economy  i. We assume  that, with 4ist held  constant, 
the  error  term,  vit, is cross-sectionally  and  serially independent  with 
zero mean  and constant  variance  or2.2 
We assume  that  the  coefficients  Xi in  equation  (14)  have  mean  + 
and variance a 2 and are distributed  independently  of vit. If log(yi t- 1) 
and  Xi are uncorrelated,  then  estimates  of  the coefficient  P3  in equa- 
tion  (14)  would  not  be  systematically  related  to  the  realization  of  st 
because  the  composite  error  term,  uit =  4ist  +  vit, is uncorrelated 
with  the  regressor,  log(y' ,t- 1).  Suppose,  alternatively,  that 
cov[log(yit-  ),  Xi]  >  0;  for  example,  if  a  positive  st represents  an 
increase  in  the  relative  price  of  oil,  then  economies  that  produce  a 
lot of  oil (4h >  4)  tend  to have  high  values of yj  toll  In this case, the 
least-squares  estimate  of the coefficient  on log(yi t- 1) in equation  (14) 
2 The  specification  in eq. (14) means  that realizations of st effectively  shift cra  in eqq. 
(12)  and  (13).  Thus  the  approach  of  4r2  to  a  steady-state  value  need  no  longer  be 
monotonic.  We  plan  in  future  research  to analyze  the  time  series  of  cr2 for  the  U.S. 
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is biased  for  a given  realization  of  s,. For example,  if oil-producing 
economies  have relatively high  values of yi,-  1, then least-squares  pro- 
cedures  tend  to underestimate  13  for  a period  in which  the oil price 
rises.3 
In  the  empirical  analysis,  we include  variables that we  think hold 
constant  the  effects  of  aggregate  shocks,  st, on  economy  i's growth 
rate.  One  reason  to  add  these  variables is to achieve  cross-sectional 
independence  of  the error terms,  vi, in equation  (14): the composite 
error,  ud  =  4ist  +  vit, would  not  exhibit  this  independence.  The 
second  purpose  is to obtain  consistent  estimates  of  the coefficient  , 
conditional  on  the realizations  of st. 
The  Data for  the  U.S.  States 
We  have  two  measures  of  per  capita  income  or  product  across  the 
U.S.  states.  The  first is per  capita  personal  income.  The  U.S.  Com- 
merce  Department  has  published  annual  data on  nominal  personal 
income  for  the  48  continental  states since  1929  (see Bureau  of  Eco- 
nomic Analysis  [1986]  and recent  issues of Survey of Current  Business). 
We  use  the  figures  that  exclude  transfer  payments  from  all  levels 
of  government.  Easterlin  (1960a,  1960b) provides  estimates  of  state 
personal  income  for  1840 (29 states or territories),  1880 (47 states or 
territories),  1900 (48 states or territories), and  1920 (48 states). These 
data also exclude  transfer  payments. 
We lack useful  measures  of price levels or price indexes  for individ- 
ual states. Therefore,  we deflate  the nominal  values for each state by 
the  national  index  for consumer  prices.  Since we use the same price 
deflator  for each state in a single  year, the particular deflator that we 
use affects only the constant terms in the subsequent  regressions.  The 
use of the same deflator  for each state introduces  two types of poten- 
tial measurement  error. First, if relative purchasing  power parity does 
not  hold  across  the  states,  then  the  growth  rates of  real  per  capita 
income  are mismeasured.  Second,  if absolute  purchasing  power  par- 
ity does  not  hold,  then  the  levels  of  real per  capita income  are mis- 
measured. 
The  second  type  of  data  is per  capita  gross  state  product  (GSP), 
which  is  available  annually  for  each  state  from  1963  to  1986  (see 
Renshaw,  Trott,  and Friedenberg  1988). This variable, which is anal- 
3 We assume  here  that yi represents  either  real per  capita income  for  residents  of 
economy  i (corresponding  to the data on state personal  income)  or the real per capita 
income  derived  from  production  of  goods  and  services  in economy  i (corresponding 
to the figures on gross state product).  Hence,  changes in relative prices show up directly 
as changes  in yi,; e.g.,  if no quantities  change,  then  an increase  in the relative price of 
oil generates  a high  growth  rate of yt, for economies  that produce  a lot of oil. 230  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
ogous  to gross domestic  product  (GDP), measures  factor incomes  de- 
rived from  production  within a state. We deflate the nominal  figures 
by the aggregate  GSP deflator  for the year. (This  deflator  is close  to 
that for U.S.  GDP.) Since we use a common  deflator  for each state at 
a point  in time,  the  particular  deflator  chosen  is again  of  no  conse- 
quence.  We should  stress, however,  that the GSP figures  that we use 
are not quantity  indexes,  but rather represent  the incomes  accruing 
to factors  from  the  goods  and services produced  within a state. 
The  main  differences  between  state personal  income  and  GSP in- 
volve capital income.  Personal  income  includes  corporate  net income 
only  when  individuals  receive  payment  as dividends,  whereas  GSP 
includes  corporate  profits  and  depreciation.  (Neither  concept  in- 
cludes  capital  gains.)  Most important,  GSP attributes capital income 
to  the  state  in  which  the  business  activity occurs,  whereas  personal 
income  attributes  it to the state of the asset holder.4 
Evidence  on  Convergence  for the U.S.  States 
We use the data on  real per capita income  or product, y,  for a cross 
section of the U.S. states, i =  1, ..  .,  N. Equations (10) and (11) imply 
that the average growth rate over the interval between any two points 
in time,  to and to +  T, is given  by 
1  Yi,to+?T  e/i-ePT 
-*  logy  )  =  B  -  K  T  )  *iog(y09 )  +  Ui'toto+T,  (15) 
where  uit0t0+T  is  a  distributed  lag  of  the  error  terms,  u-t, between 
dates to and to +  T.5 The  constant  term is B  =  x  +  [(1  -  e IT)T] 
[log('*)  +  xto], which  is independent  of  i because  we assumed f* - 
9* and xi =  x. The  coefficient  B shifts because of the trend in technol- 
ogy with a change  in the starting date,  to. 
The  coefficient  on  log(yt,)  in  equation  (15)  is  -(1  -  e-T)IT, 
which declines  in magnitude  with the length  of  the interval,  T, for a 
given  P3.  As  T  gets  larger,  the  effect  of  the  initial  position  on  the 
average growth rate gets smaller; as T tends to infinity, the coefficient 
tends to zero. We estimate  P3  nonlinearly  to take account of the associ- 
ated  value  of  T in the  form  of  equation  (15).  Therefore,  we should 
obtain  similar estimates  of  P3  regardless  of  the length  of  the interval. 
Table  1 contains  nonlinear  least-squares regressions  in the form of 
4 Some  of  these  locational  considerations  apply  also  to  labor  income,  although- 
except  for  a few  cities-the  location  of  a business  and  the  residence  of  the  workers 
are typically in the  same  state. 
5 The  error  term  is  lIT  times  the  sum  for  T  between  zero  and  T  of  the  error 
terms,  Uito+T, weighted  by e-(TT). TABLE  1 
CROSS-STATE  REGRESSIONS  FOR  PERSONAL  INCOME 
Sectoral 
Composition 
Sample  (Sit)  R  v 
1.  1880-1988  .0175  ...  .92  .0014 
(.0046) 
2.  1880-1900  .0224  ...  .62  .0054 
(.0040) 
3.  1900-1920  .0209  ...  .67  .0062 
(.0063) 
4.  1920-30  -.0122  ...  .43  .0111 
(.0074) 
5.  1930-40  .0127  ...  .36  .0075 
(.0051) 
6.  1940-50  .0373  ...  .86  .0057 
(.0053) 
7.  1950-60  .0202  ...  .49  .0048 
(.0052) 
8.  1960-70  .0135  ...  .68  .0037 
(.0043) 
9.  1970-80  .0119  ...  .36  .0056 
(.0069) 
10.  1980-88  -  .0005  ...  .51  .0103 
(.0114) 
11.  Nine  periods,  .0189  ...  ...  ... 
,B  restricted*  (.0019) 
12.  1880-1900  .0268  -  .0161  .65  .0053 
(.0048)  (.0079) 
13.  1900-1920  .0269  -  .0214  .71  .0060 
(.0075)  (.0094) 
14.  1920-30  .0218  -  .0936  .64  .0089 
(.0112)  (.0175) 
15.  1930-40  .0141  2.43  .46  .0070 
(.0048)  (.81) 
16.  1940-50  .0362  -.40  .87  .0057 
(.0055)  (.57) 
17.  1950-60  .0313  .42  .65  .0041 
(.0055)  (.09) 
18.  1960-70  .0194  .55  .71  .0036 
(.0052)  (.25) 
19.  1970-80  .0139  .25  .36  .0056 
(.0076)  (.37) 
20.  1980-88  .0196  1.35  .73  .0077 
(.0106)  (.22) 
21.  Nine  periods,  .0249  individual  ... 
,B  restricted*  (.0021) 
22.  1840-80  .0254  ...  .91  .0030 
(.0067) 
NOTE.-Standard  errors of coefficients  are shown in parentheses.  Regression  22 has 29 observations,  regressions 
1 and 2 have 47  observations  (excluding  Oklahoma),  and regression  12 has 46 observations  (excluding  Oklahoma 
and  Wyoming).  All  others  have  48  observations.  The  dependent  variable  is the  growth  rate of  real  per  capita 
personal  income  exclusive  of  transfers  over  the indicated  sample  period.  Each regression  includes  a constant  and 
three  regional  dummy  variables, south,  midwest,  and west. (Regression  22 includes  only  south and midwest.)  The 
coefficient  d applies  to log(yiO),  where yi o is real per capita personal income  at the start of the period. The  sectoral 
composition  variable, Si,  is described  in the text. The  regressions  denoted  nine  periods,  3 restricted use nonlinear, 
iterative  weighted  least  squares,  with the  coefficient  3 constrained  to be equal  for all nine  subperiods.  Individual 
coefficients  are  estimated  for  each  subperiod  for  the  constant,  regional  dummies,  and  the  sectoral  composition 
variable. 
* For  line  11,  the  log  likelihood  ratio  is  32.1  (p-value  =  .000);  for  line  21,  it is  13.9  (p-value  =  .084).  The 
likelihood  ratio statistic refers  to the  hypothesis  of  equality  for  the  3 coefficients.  Under  the  null hypothesis,  this 
statistic is distributed  as x2 with eight  degrees  of  freedom. 232  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
equation  (15)  for  the  U.S.  states or territories  and  for  various  time 
periods.6  Aside  from  log(yitO), each  regression  includes  a  constant 
and  three  regional  dummy  variables: south,  midwest,  and west.  (To 
save space, the estimated coefficients  for the constant and the regional 
dummies  are not shown  in the table.) Because  the regional  dummies 
are  held  constant,  the  effect  of  initial  per  capita  income  does  not 
reflect purely  regional  differences,  such as the southern  states' catch- 
ing up with the  northern  states.7 
For the longest  interval,  1880-1988  (for 47 observations),  the esti- 
mated convergence  coefficient  shown  in line  1 of table 1 is  B=  .0 175 
(standard  error  =  .0046).  Figure  1 shows  the dramatic inverse  rela- 
tion  between  the  average  growth  rate  from  1880  to  1988  and 
log(y1880):  the simple  correlation  is  -.93. 
The  full  time  series  for yi, (1880,  1900,  1920,  and  annually  from 
1929)  potentially  provides  more  information  about the coefficient  J3. 
For a smaller  value  of  T, however,  the  error  term  in equation  (15), 
Uitoto+T,  represents  an  average  of  shocks  over  a  shorter  interval. 
Therefore,  the  estimates  become  more  sensitive  to the  specification 
of the error process.  In particular, if there  is serial persistence  in the 
error  term-, uit  then  the  correlation  between  ui0toIto+T  and log(yi to) is 
likely to be negligible  for large  T but substantial for small T. For this 
reason,  we have not attempted  to use the full annual time series that 
starts in  1929. 
Lines  2-10  of  table  1 show  estimates  of  P3  for  nine  subperiods  of 
the  overall  sample:  1880-1900,  1900-1920,  10-year intervals  from 
1920 to  1980,  and  1980-88.  (There  are 47 observations  for the first 
subperiod  and 48 for the others.)  Each regression  includes a constant 
and  the  three  regional  dummies.  The  results  show values  of  1 that 
range  from  -.0122  (.0074)  for  1920-30  to  .0373  (.0053)  for 
1940-50. 
If  all nine  subperiods  are  restricted  to  have  a single  value  for  , 
then  the  estimate  is 13  =  .0 189  (.0019)  in  line  11. This  estimation 
allows each subperiod  to have individual  coefficients  for the constant 
and  the  regional  dummies.8  The  joint  estimate  of  P3  is close  to  the 
value  .0175  estimated  for  the  single  interval  1880-1988.  But,  as 
would  be  expected,  the  standard  error  from  the joint  estimation, 
6 See  App.  A  for  a  discussion  of  the  effects  of  measurement  error  in Yit  on  the 
estimates  of  P. 
7The  estimated  1 convergence  across regions  turns out to be similar to that within 
regions  (see Barro and  Sala-i-Martin  1991a). 
8 It would  be  possible  to restrict the  constants  if it were  maintained  that each state 
experienced  exogenous  technological  progress  at the  constant  rate x. We could  then 
use  the  whole  sample  to  estimate  a single  constant  and  the  value  of x. We have  not 
imposed  these  restrictions  because  we  have  no  reason  to think  that the  rate of  tech- 
nological  change  would  be the same  over  all time periods. CONVERGENCE  233 
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FIG.  1.-Growth  rate from  1880  to  1988 vs.  1880 per capita income 
.00 19, is a good  deal  smaller  than  that,  .0046,  found  for  the  single 
interval.  The  problem  with  the joint  estimate  is that the  data reject 
the hypothesis  that the coefficient  I3  is the same for the nine subperi- 
ods.  The  likelihood  ratio  statistic  for  this  hypothesis,  32.1,  is well 
above the  5 percent  critical value  from  the x2 distribution  with eight 
degrees  of  freedom  of  15.5  (p-value  =  .000). 
The  unstable  pattern of  X coefficients  across subperiods  can reflect 
aggregate  disturbances  that have differential  effects  on state incomes, 
as represented  by the term 4ist in equation  (14). For example,  during 
the  1920s,  the  ratio of  the  wholesale  price  index  for  farm  products 
to the overall  consumer  price index  fell at an average  annual  rate of 
3.5 percent.  The  agricultural states also had below-average  per capita 
personal  income  in  1920:  the correlation  of  log(y1920) with the share 
of national income  originating  in agriculture  in 1920 was  -  .67. Thus 
the  estimated  coefficient,  IB  =  -.0122,  for  the  1920-30  period  in 
table  1 likely reflects  the tendency  of  the poorer  states to be agricul- 
tural and therefore  to experience  relatively low growth in this decade. 
This  effect  reverses  for  the  1940-50  decade,  when  the  ratio of  the 
wholesale  price index  for farm products to the overall consumer  price 
index  grew  at an average  annual  rate of 9,5  percent. 
To  hold  constant  this  type  of  effect,  we  construct  a variable that 
measures  the  sectoral  composition  of  income  in each  state.  For the 
subperiods  that begin  since  1930, we use a breakdown  of the sources 
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categories:  agriculture;  mining;  construction;  manufacturing;  trans- 
portation  and public utilities;  wholesale  and retail trade; finance,  in- 
surance,  and  real estate;  services;  and  government  and  government 
enterprises.  For each subperiod,  we construct  a sectoral composition 
variable for state i: 
9  / 
Sit  wijt  log(  jt  T),  (16) 
j=1  j 
where  wit is the weight  of sectorj  in state i's personal  income  at time 
t and Yjt  is the national  average  of  personal  income  that originates  in 
sector j  at time  t, expressed  as a ratio to national  population  at time 
t. Aside  from  the  effect  of  changing  sectoral weights  within  a state, 
the  variable sit would  equal  the  growth  rate  of  per  capita  personal 
income  in  state  i  between  years  t and  t  +  T if  each  of  the  state's 
sectors grew at the national average rate for that sector. In particular, 
the  variable reflects  shocks  to agriculture,  oil, and  so forth  in a way 
that interacts  with state i's concentration  in the  sectors  that do  rela- 
tively well or badly in terms of  income  because  of  the shocks. 
We think of  the  variable sit as a proxy  for common  effects  related 
to sectoral composition  in the error term in equation  (15). Note  that 
sit  depends  on contemporaneous  realizations of national variables, but 
only  on  lagged  values  of  state  variables.  Because  the  impact  of  an 
individual  state on national aggregates  is small, sit  can be nearly exog- 
enous  with respect  to the current  individual  error term for state i. In 
any event,  we assume  that, with sit held constant,  the error terms are 
independent  across states and over  time. 
For the  subperiods  that begin  before  1930,  we  lack detailed  data 
on the sectoral composition  of personal  income,  but we have data on 
the  fraction  of  national  income  originating  in agriculture.  For these 
subperiods,  we  use  this  fraction  as a measure  of  sit. Note  that  the 
different  methods  of  construction  and  the differing  behavior  of  ag- 
ricultural relative  prices  mean  that the coefficients  of  the variable sit 
will vary from  one  subperiod  to  another.  Therefore,  we estimate  a 
separate  coefficient  on sit for each  subperiod. 
Lines  12-20  in table 1 add the variable sit  to the growth rate regres- 
sions  for  each  subperiod.  (The  first subperiod  has  46  observations 
and  the  others  have  48.)  As  before,  these  regressions  include 
log(yito), a constant,  and  three  regional  dummies.  Not  surprisingly, 
the  estimated  coefficients  on  the  variable sit for  the  post-1930  sub- 
periods  are  typically  positive.  That  is, states in which  income  origi- 
nates predominantly  in sectors that do well at the national level tend 
to have higher  per capita growth rates. (The estimated  coefficient  for 
the  1940-50  subperiod  is negative,  but not significantly  so.) For the CONVERGENCE  235 
subperiods  that begin  before  1930, the negative estimated  coefficient 
on  sit  signifies  that,  with  initial  per  capita  income  and  region  held 
constant,  agricultural  states have lower per capita growth rates. This 
pattern  is especially  clear  for  the  agricultural  price  collapse  in  the 
1920-30  decade:  the estimated  coefficient  on sit is  -.0936  (.0175). 
For our  purposes,  the  principal  finding  from  the  addition  of  the 
sectoral composition  variables is that the estimated  P3  coefficients  be- 
come  much  more  stable across subperiods.  The  range  is now  .0139 
(.0076)  for  1970-80  to  .0362  (.0055)  for  1940-50.  Line  21  shows 
that the jointly  estimated  coefficient  for the nine  subperiods  is .0249 
(.0021).  (This joint  estimation  allows each subperiod  to have individ- 
ual  coefficients  for  sit  as  well  as  for  the  constant  and  the  regional 
dummies.)  The  likelihood  ratio statistic for  the  equality of  P coeffi- 
cients  across  the  nine  subperiods  is  now  13.9,  compared  to  the  5 
percent  critical value of  15.5. Thus  if we hold constant  the measures 
of sectoral composition,  we no longer  reject the hypothesis  of a single 
f3 coefficient  at the  5 percent  level  (p-value  =  .084). 
The  agriculture  share  variable, which  was included  to measure  sit 
for  the  earlier  subperiods  in table  1 (lines  12-14  and  the joint  esti- 
mate  in  line  21),  holds  constant  compositional  effects  on  aggregate 
state income  that reflect shifts of  persons  out of agriculture  and into 
higher-productivity  jobs  in industry  and services.  If we add the agri- 
culture  share variable to the later subperiods,  then the joint  estimate 
for nine  subperiods  becomes  ,3 =  .0224  (.0022),  slightly less than the 
value  shown  in line  21.  This  estimate  of  IB  is virtually unchanged  if 
we include  the  change  in the  agriculture  share over  each  subperiod 
in the regressions.  Thus  convergence  at a rate of about 2 percent  per 
year is net of  effects  from  changes  in agricultural  shares. 
In  general,  industry  mix  effects  would  matter  for  the  results  if 
changes  in income  shares among  sectors with different  average levels 
of productivity  are correlated  with initial levels of per capita income. 
It is unclear  that we would  want to filter out all these  effects  to mea- 
sure convergence,  but, in any event,  our examination  of productivity 
data from the post-World  War II period indicates that shifts between 
agriculture  and nonagriculture  would be the main effect  of this type. 
Since  we  already  held  constant  the  compositional  effect  for  agricul- 
ture,  it is unlikely  that  industry  mix  effects  are a major element  in 
the estimated  convergence  for state personal  income. 
The  final result  from  table  1 is a regression  with the  29  available 
observations  from  1840 to  1880.9 This  regression  includes  a constant 
9 Easterlin  (1960a,  p.  124 ff.)  indicates  that the data for  1840  do  not cover income 
originating  in wholesale  and  retail trade;  finance,  insurance,  and  real estate; govern- 
ment;  and  most  other  services.  The  figures  that  we  use  for  1880  in  the  1840-80 
regressions  are comparable  in coverage  to those  for  1840. This  more limited coverage 236  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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FIG. 2.-Growth  rate from  1840 to  1880 vs.  1840 per capita income 
and two regional  dummies  (no western  states are in the sample).  We 
exclude  the variable s - because  the data are unavailable. The  estimate 
in line  22  is  3 =  .0254  (.0067),  which  accords  with  the  estimate  of 
.0249  (.0021)  for the  subperiods  that begin  after  1880 (line 21). 
Figure 2 plots the per capita growth rate from  1840 to 1880 against 
log(yI840).  A  remarkable  aspect  of  the  plot  is the  separation  of  the 
southern  and  nonsouthern  states because  of  the Civil War. In  1840, 
the southern  and nonsouthern  states differed  little in terms of  aver- 
age per capita income:  the unweighted  average of  11 southern  states 
was 94  percent  of  that for  18 eastern  and  Midwestern  states. But in 
1880  a wide  gap  had  appeared  and  the  southern  average  was only 
50 percent  of the nonsouthern.  The  figure shows, however,  that con- 
vergence  applies  to the southern  and nonsouthern  states as separate 
groups.  That  is, with the regional  dummies  held  constant  (which ef- 
fectively  hold  constant  the impact of the Civil War), there  is a strong 
negative  correlation  between  the per capita growth rate and the initial 
level of  per capita income. 
The  Civil War affected  states differentially,  but, in contrast to the 
shock to agriculture  in the  1920s, the effect  of the Civil War on state 
per  capita  income  had  little  correlation  with  the  initial level  of  per 
for  1880 comprises  about half the income  included  in the measure  that we used  previ- 
ously.  In  any  event,  the  limited  figures  for  1840  are not comparable  to the  data  for 
years after  1880. CONVERGENCE  237 
capita income.  For this reason,  we do  not  get a very different  point 
estimate of I for the  1840-80  subperiod  if we eliminate  the regional 
dummies:  the estimate  without  these  dummies  is I  =  .0203  (.0126). 
The  fall  in  the  R2 of  the  regression  from  .91  in  line  22  of  table  1 
to  .19  indicates,  however,  that  the  regional  dummies  have  a lot  of 
explanatory  power  in this period! 
Results  with  Gross  State Product 
Table  2 and  figure  3 deal  with the  growth  of  per capita GSP for 48 
states over the period  1963-86.  Recall that the data are nominal  GSP 
divided  by  an  aggregate,  national  price  deflator.  The  growth  rates 
TABLE  2 
CROSS-STATE  REGRESSIONS  FOR  GROSS  STATE  PRODUCT 
Sectoral 
Sample  Composition  2 
Sample  ,B(sit)  R2  a 
1.  1963-86  .0180  ...  .48  .0038 
(.0059) 
2.  1963-69  .0154  ...  .63  .0056 
(.0060) 
3.  1969-75  .0406  ...  .41  .0120 
(.0162) 
4.  1975-81  -  .0285  ...  .17  .0139 
(.0130) 
5.  1981-86  .1130  ...  .62  .0168 
(.0244) 
6.  Four  periods,  .0211  ...  ...  ... 
f  restricted*  (.0053) 
7.  1963-69  .0157  .18  .63  .0056 
(.0060)  (.25) 
8.  1969-75  .0297  1.56  .74  .0081 
(.0101)  (.20) 
9.  1975-81  .0258  1.74  .78  .0072 
(.0108)  (.15) 
10.  1981-86  .0238  1.73  .92  .0079 
(.0091)  (.13) 
11.  Four periods,  .0216  individual  ...  ... 
,3 restricted*  (.0042) 
12.  1963-86  .0222  .63  .54  .0036 
(.0065)  (.27) 
NOTE.-All  regressions  have 48  observations.  The  dependent  variable is the growth  rate of real per capita GSP 
(nominal  GSP  per  capita  divided  by  the  national  deflator  for  GSP).  The  regressions  denoted  four  periods,  P 
restricted use nonlinear,  iterative weighted  least squares, with the coefficient  J constrained  to be equal for the four 
subperiods.  See  also the  notes  to table  1. 
* For line  6, the  log  likelihood  ratio is 31.2  (p-value  =  .000);  for  line  II,  it is  1.7 (p-value  =  .637).  Under  the 
null hypothesis  of equal coefficients,  the likelihood  ratio statistic is distributed  as x2  with three degrees  of freedom. 238  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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FIG. 3.-Growth  rate from  1963 to  1986 vs.  1963 per capita GSP 
therefore  pick up changes  in relative prices that interact with a state's 
composition  of production.  However,  the structural variable, sit, holds 
constant  these  effects  from  changes  in relative prices. 
For  the  full  sample,  1963-86,  the  estimated  convergence  coeffi- 
cient in line  1 of table 2 is 13  =  .0 180 (.0059).  This regression  includes 
a constant  and the three  regional  dummy  variables, but no measures 
of  sectoral  composition.  The  regressions  over  subperiods  (1963-69, 
1969-75,  1975-81,  and  1981-86  in lines 2-5)  show marked instabil- 
ity in A: it ranges  from  -.0285  in 1975-81  to .1130  in 1981-86.  The 
joint  estimate  of  1 for  the  four  subperiods  (line  6) is .0211  (.0053), 
but the  hypothesis  of  equal coefficients  is rejected  (p-value  =  .000). 
We again  add  a measure  of  sectoral composition,  sit, analogous  to 
that defined  in  equation  (16).  The  difference  is that the  data allow 
us to disaggregate  into  54  sectors  for  the  origination  of  GSP. Lines 
7-10  in  table  2  show  that  the  1 coefficients  are  similar  across  the 
subperiods  when  the  variable sit is held  constant.  The joint  estimate 
in line  11 is P  =  .0216  (.0042),  and the hypothesis  of stability across 
the four subperiods  is accepted  at the 5 percent level (p-value  =  .64). 
Some of the instability in the 1 coefficients  with the GSP data relates 
to the movements  in oil prices.  Oil prices and, hence,  the incomes  of 
oil states rose substantially during  the subperiod  1975-81.  Moreover, 
the oil states were  already relatively high  in per capita GSP by 1975: 
the correlation  of  per  capita GSP with the  share of  GSP originating 
in crude oil and natural gas was .4. The  tendency  of the rich oil states 
to grow at relatively  high  rates upsets  the usual convergence  pattern CONVERGENCE  239 
and  thereby  leads  to  the  negative  value  for  A,  -.0285,  shown  for 
1975-81  in line 4 of table 2.'? But when  sectoral composition  is held 
constant in line 9, the value of 13  for  1975-81  is similar to that found 
in the other  periods. 
For the  1981-86  period,  the key elements  are the sharp decline  in 
oil  prices  and  the  high  correlation,  .7, between  per  capita  GSP and 
the  share  of  GSP  originating  in  oil  and  natural  gas  in  1981.  The 
tendency  for  oil states to do  relatively badly in  1981-86  leads  to an 
exaggerated  convergence  coefficient,  13  =  .1130,  in line  5.11 Again, 
the  inclusion  of  the  variable  sit  in line 9 leads  to a normal  value  for 
Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (199la)  disaggregate  the  nonagricultural 
part of GSP into value added  per worker for eight  sectors. The  main 
finding  is that convergence  shows up significantly within these sectors 
of production,  especially for manufacturing.  For the nonmanufactur- 
ing sectors,  the overall estimate  of ,3 is somewhat  less than 2 percent 
per  year,  whereas  for  manufacturing  the  estimate  is over  4  percent 
per year. The  main inference  from  these  results is that poorer  states 
grow  faster  not  only  in terms of  overall  GSP per  person,  but also in 
terms  of  labor  productivity  within  various  sectors  of  production. 
Thus,  as suggested  before  for personal  income,  the findings  on con- 
vergence  cannot  be explained  by changes  over  time in the composi- 
tion of  production. 
Income  versus  Product 
In  a closed-economy  growth  model,  the  convergence  properties  of 
income  and  product  must  coincide.  Perhaps  surprisingly-because 
the U.S.  states do not look like closed  economies-the  empirical  esti- 
mates of  f  for personal  income  are nearly equal to those  for GSP. If 
the  estimation  for  personal  income  is limited  to a time  span  similar 
to  that  covered  by  GSP-namely  the  three  subperiods  1960-70, 
1970-80,  and  1980-88-then  the joint  estimate is ,3 =  .0181  (.0040). 
Although  this  point  estimate  is less  than  that,  .0216  (.0042),  shown 
for GSP in table 2, line  11, the principal finding  is that the estimates 
are close. 
The  assumptions  of a closed  economy  are implausible  for the U.S. 
10This  argument  does  not  apply  to  the  subperiod  1969-75  (line  3  of  table  2). 
Although  the  oil  price  rose  substantially  over  this  period,  the  oil  states  did  not 
have especially  high  values  of  per capita GSP in  1969. 
"' The  results for personal  income  over the period  1980-88  (table 1, line  10) do not 
show  the  same  pattern.  The  main  difference  is  that  the  correlation  in  1980  of  the 
logarithm  of  per  capita  personal  income  with the  share  of  income  originating  in oil 
and  natural  gas is close  to zero. 240  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
states: goods  and  technologies  flow across borders,  residents  of  one 
state can borrow  from  residents  of  other  states, and  internal  migra- 
tion  is possible.  In  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin (1991b,  chap.  2), we ex- 
tend  the  neoclassical  growth  model  to allow for internationally  trad- 
able goods  and a global capital market. These  features  create a sharp 
distinction  between  domestic  product  and  income  or,  equivalently, 
between  domestic  capital  stock  and  assets.  If  technologies  are  the 
same, then an economy's  per capita capital stock and output  converge 
rapidly to those  prevailing  in other economies.  In contrast, even if all 
economies  have  the  same  parameters  of  preferences  and  technolo- 
gies, per capita incomes  do not converge  because each small economy 
faces constant  returns on the global capital market. Thus  our empiri- 
cal findings-that  rates  of  convergence  are  similar  for  income  and 
product  across the U.S.  states-are  puzzling  from the perspective  of 
this theory.  We offer  here  some  conjectures  that may help  to resolve 
this puzzle. 
We have modified  the analysis along  the lines of Cohen  and Sachs 
(1986)  to allow for a ceiling on the ratio of an economy's external  debt 
to its capital stock. This  restriction  on credit markets is reasonable  if 
the capital stock represents  the collateral that secures  the debt.  If we 
interpret  capital  broadly  to include  human  capital, then  this frame- 
work  applies  to  the  U.S.  states  if  the  residents  or  government  of  a 
state cannot  borrow  nationally  to finance  all their  desired  expendi- 
tures  on  education  or other  forms  of  investment  in human  capital. 
The  key result  from  the addition  of  the borrowing  constraint  is that 
domestic  product  behaves eventually like national income.  Hence,  the 
convergence  properties  of  product  and  income  can be similar, as in 
our empirical  results. 
If  technologies  (i.e.,  anything  represented  by the  coefficient  A in 
eq.  [7]) differ  across  economies,  then  mobility  of  capital can create 
divergence  of  per  capita  output  and  capital stocks.  Economies  with 
higher  k tend  to  have  higher  values  of  A, and  the  higher  A offsets 
the  effect  of  diminishing  returns  in  the  determination  of  capital's 
marginal  product.  Therefore,  capital (physical or human)  may move 
from  poorer  to richer  economies,  and  it is no  longer  clear theoreti- 
cally that the convergence  coefficient  for product  would  exceed  that 
for  income.  Once  we  allow  for  differences  in  technologies,  we  also 
have to consider  the diffusion  of technology  across economies,  along 
the  lines  of  Nelson  and  Phelps  (1966).  The  potential  to  imitate  is 
another  reason  for  poor,  follower  economies  to  grow  at  relatively 
high  rates. 
We have  extended  the  neoclassical  growth  model  to allow for  mi- 
gration  of  persons,  another  force  that promotes  convergence  of  per 
capita  product  and  income  across  economies.  Sala-i-Martin  (1990, CONVERGENCE  241 
table  5.2)  and  Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (199la)  relate  net  migration 
for the U.S. states to initial values of per capita personal income  over 
subperiods  of  the interval  from  1900 to  1987. These  studies  confirm 
that net in-migration  is positively  related  to initial per capita income. 
But the results also show that the estimated  convergence  coefficients, 
A, are little affected  by the inclusion  of  net migration  as an explana- 
tory variable in the growth  rate equations.  Moreover,  we have shown 
that the minor interplay between  migration and convergence  is quan- 
titatively consistent  with the  neoclassical  growth  model  (extended  to 
allow  for  migration),  given  the  estimated  sensitivity of  migration  to 
income  differentials. 
We leave as an unresolved  puzzle the similar estimates for the rates 
of  convergence  of  per  capita  income  and  product.  We think  that  a 
resolution  of  this  puzzle  will  involve  the  construction  of  an  open- 
economy  growth  model  that  satisfactorily  incorporates  credit  mar- 
kets, factor  mobility,  and  technological  diffusion. 
Comparisons  with  Findings  across  Countries 
In this section we compare  our findings  for the U.S. states with analo- 
gous  results  across  countries.  It is well  known  that  growth  rates of 
real per  capita  GDP  are  uncorrelated  with  the  starting  level  of  real 
per capita GDP across a large  group  of countries  in the post-World 
War II  period.  Barro  (1991)  uses  the  Summers-Heston  (1988)  data 
set  along  with  other  data  to  analyze  the  growth  experiences  of  98 
countries  from  1960  to  1985.  (The  limitation  to 98 countries  rather 
than  the  114  market  economies  with  Summers-Heston  GDP  data 
from  1960  to  1985  comes  from  the lack of  information  on  variables 
other  than GDP.) Line  1 of table 3 shows that a regression  for the 98 
countries  in  the  form  of  equation  (15)  leads  to  the  estimate  1  = 
-.0037  (.0018).  The  dependent  variable  is the  growth  rate of  real 
per capita GDP from  1960  to  1985.  The  only independent  variables 
are a constant  and  the  log  of  1960  per  capita GDP,  log(y1960).  The 
main finding,  also depicted  in figure 4, is the lack of a close relation- 
ship between  the growth  rate and log(y1960).  In fact, the convergence 
coefficient  1 has the wrong  sign; that is, there is a small tendency  for 
the  initially  rich  countries  to  grow  faster  than  the  poor  ones  after 
1960. 
These  cross-country  results  contrast  sharply with the findings  dis- 
cussed  earlier  for the U.S.  states. Figures  1 and 3 and tables  1 and 2 
showed  that, particularly over the longer  samples, there is a clear and 
substantial  negative  correlation  between  starting  per  capita  income 
or  product  and  the  subsequent  growth  rate.  Line  5 of  table  3 uses 
a  specification  for  the  U.S.  states  that  parallels  the  one  used  for TABLE  3 
COMPARISON  OF  REGRESSIONS  ACROSS  COUNTRIES  AND  U.S.  STATES 
Additional 
Sample  Variables  R  2  6 
1.  98 countries,  -.0037  no  .04  .0183 
1960-85  (.0018) 
2.  98 countries,  .0184  yes  .52  .0133 
1960-85  (.0045) 
3.  20 OECD  countries,  .0095  no  .45  .0051 
1960-85  (.0028) 
4.  20 OECD  countries,  .0203  yes  .69  .0046 
1960-85  (.0068) 
5.  48  U.S.  states,  .0218  no  .38  .0040 
1963-86  (.0053) 
6.  48  U.S.  states,  .0236  yes  .61  .0033 
1963-86  (.0013) 
NOTE.-The  dependent  variable in regressions  1-4  is the growth rate of real per capita GDP from  1960 to 1985; 
in regressions  5 and 6 it is the growth  rate of  real per capita GSP (the variable used in table 2) from  1963 to  1986. 
The  coefficient  P applies  in regressions  1-4  to the logarithm  of  real per capita GDP in  1960, and in regressions  5 
and  6 to the  logarithm  of  real  per  capita  GSP in  1963.  Each regression  also includes  a constant.  The  additional 
variables  included  in  regressions  2  and  4  are  the  primary  and  secondary  school  enrollment  rates  in  1960,  the 
average  ratio of  government  consumption  expenditure  (standard  figures  less spending  on defense  and education) 
to GDP from  1970 to  1985, the average  number  of revolutions  and coups  per year from  1960 to  1985, the average 
number  of  political assassinations  per capita per year from  1960 to  1985, and the average deviation  from unity of 
the Summers-Heston  (1988)  purchasing  power  parity ratio for investment  in  1960. See Barro (1991)  for details on 
these  variables.  The  additional  explanatory  variables  included  in regression  6 are regional  dummies,  the  sectoral 
composition  variable, si,  and the fraction of  workers in  1960 that had accumulated  some amount  of college  educa- 
tion. The  20 OECD countries  (the original  membership  in  1960) are Austria, Belgium,  Canada, Denmark,  France, 
Germany,  Greece,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Italy, Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzer- 
land, Turkey,  United  Kingdom,  and United  States. 
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the  countries.  The  variables  are  based  on  GSP over  the  time  pe- 
riod  1963-86,  and  the regression  includes  only log(y1963) and a con- 
stant as regressors.  The  estimate  in this case is ,3 =  .0218  (.0053). 
Barro (1991,  table  1, fig. 2) shows that a significantly negative  par- 
tial relation  between  the  per  capita growth  rate from  1960  to  1985 
and log(y1960) emerges  for the 98 countries if some other variables are 
held constant. The  set of other variables in the main results consists of 
primary and  secondary  school  enrollment  rates in  1960,  the average 
ratio of  government  consumption  expenditure  (exclusive  of  defense 
and education)  to GDP from  1970 to 1985, proxies for political stabil- 
ity, and  a measure  of  market distortions  based on purchasing  power 
parity ratios for  investment  goods.  If we include  these  variables for 
the  98  countries  in the  form  of  equation  (15),  then  line  2 of  table 3 
shows that the estimated  convergence  coefficient  becomes  ,B =  .0184 
(.0045).  This  estimate  of  13  is no  longer  very much  below  the  cross- 
state value  shown  in line  5 of  the table. 
The  theoretical  relation  in equation  (15) predicts  conditional  con- 
vergence,  that is, a negative  relation between  log(yito) and the subse- 
quent  growth  rate  if  we  hold  constant  the  steady-state  position, 
log(j%>, and  the  steady-state  growth  rate,  xi.  (The  constant  B  in 
eq. [15] depends  on log[y1  and xi.) The  theory implies  that the rela- 
tion between  log(yito) and the growth  rate will be negative  unless the 
correlation  between  log(yiO)  and  the  two  omitted  factors,  log(9,) 
and xi, is substantially  positive. 
The  U.S.  states are likely to be  reasonably  homogeneous  with re- 
spect to the steady-state  values log(9i)  and xi. That is, the differences 
in  initial  positions,  log(yiO),  may  be  relatively  much  greater.  (This 
condition  is especially  compelling  if the initial differences  reflect ex- 
ogenous  events,  such  as  wars,  world  agricultural  harvests,  and  oil 
shocks.)  In  this case,  the  negative  relation  between  the  growth  rate 
and log(y 00)  would show up even if the differences  in the steady-state 
values  are  not  held  constant:  conditional  and  absolute  convergence 
would coincide.  The  result for 13  shown in line 5 of table 3 is consistent 
with this perspective. 
In contrast,  the sample  of 98 countries  likely features  large differ- 
ences in the steady-state  values, log(j1)  and xi, that is, in the underly- 
ing parameters  of technology  and preferences  (and natural resources 
and government  policies)  that determine  these  long-run  values. The 
absence  of  substantial  labor  mobility  across countries  reinforces  the 
possibility of substantial divergences  in these steady-state values. The 
correlation  of log(y ,,O)  with log(9  is likely to be substantially positive; 
that is, economies  with higher  steady-state values of output  per effec- 
tive worker would have followed  a path that led them today to higher 
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xi is likely to be positive. Because of these relations, the simple correla- 
tion between  the  growth  rate and  log(yi to)  could  be close  to zero,  as 
indicated  by the  data  in  figure  4.  (This  point  is made  by King  and 
Rebelo  [1989,  pp.  12-13].)  On  the  other  hand,  if we include  addi- 
tional  variables  that  hold  constant  some  of  the  cross-country  varia- 
tions in log(yi)  and xi, then  the  partial relation  between  growth  rate 
and  log(yito) should  become  more  negative.  We interpret  the  addi- 
tional  variables  that we  added  to the  cross-country  regression  (table 
3, line  2) in this manner.  Accordingly,  we view the  estimate  of  0  in 
this regression-which  is no longer  very much below the values from 
the  cross-state  regressions-as  coming  closer  to the  theoretical  con- 
vergence  coefficient. 
We can evaluate  these  arguments  further  by considering  a group 
of relatively homogeneous  countries,  the 20 original  members  of the 
OECD.12 Figure  5 shows that the per capita growth rate is negatively 
related to the log of initial per capita GDP for this group of countries. 
The  regression  in  line  3  of  table  3  includes  only  a  constant  and 
the  log  of  1960  per  capita  GDP. The  estimated  convergence  coeffi- 
cient  is 13  =  .0095  (.0028),  which  is significant  and  has the expected 
sign.  The  magnitude  is,  however,  about  half  that  applicable  to  the 
U.S. states (line 5). Our interpretation  is that the OECD countries  are 
intermediate  between  the  98-country  group  and  the  U.S.  states  in 
terms of  the  extent  of  cross-country  variation  in steady-state  values, 
log(j^5 and  xi, relative  to  the  variation  in  initial  positions,  log(yito). 
Line 4 of  the  table shows  that the  estimate  for  the OECD  countries 
becomes  1 =  .0203  (.0068)  when  the  additional  variables discussed 
before  are  added  to  the  regression.  This  estimate  does  not  differ 
greatly from  the comparable  value for 98 countries,  .0184  (.0045)  in 
line 2. 
We have  also  explored  in a preliminary  way the  addition  of  vari- 
ables as proxies  for the steady-state values, log(5^5:  and xi, in the cross- 
state regressions.  One  variable that has a significantly  positive  influ- 
ence on the growth  rate is the fraction of the work force in 1960 that 
had accumulated  some amount  of college  education.'3  We added  this 
variable  along  with  the  regional  dummies  and  sectoral  composition 
variable,  sit,  that  we  discussed  before.  Line  6  of  table  3 shows  that 
the  estimated  convergence  coefficient  becomes  i  =  .0236  (.0013), 
compared  with  .0218  (.0053)  in  line  5.  Thus  the  inclusion  of  these 
12 We exclude  the  four  countries  added  after  1960  (Australia,  Finland, Japan,  and 
New Zealand) because of the possibility that the extension  of membership  was endoge- 
nous  and  related  to the  growth  experience. 
13 The  data on educational  attainment  come from various issues of Statistical  Abstract. 
We  have  not  had  much  success  in  finding  growth  rate  effects  related  to  cross-state 
differences  in government  expenditures.  Also, educational  differences  aside from col- 
lege  attainment  were  not  important. CONVERGENCE  245 
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FIG. 5.-Growth  rate from  1960 to  1985 vs.  1960 per capital GDP, OECD countries 
(listed  in App.  B). 
other  variables has a positive,  but minor,  effect  on the estimate  of  1 
across the  U.S.  states. 
Overall,  the impact  of  the additional  variables on 13  is greatest  for 
the  98  countries  (.0184  in  line  2  vs.  -  .0037  in  line  1), next  most 
important  for  the  20  OECD  countries  (.0203  in  line  4  vs.  .0095  in 
line 3), and  least important  for the 48 U.S.  states. These  findings  are 
consistent  with  the  idea  that,  first,  the  other  variables  help  to  hold 
constant  cross-sectional  differences  in  the  long-run  values,  log(gas 
and xi, and, second,  that the ranking of the extent of these differences 
(relative to the differences  in log[yuno])  goes  from the 98 countries  to 
the  20 OECD  countries  to the 48 U.S.  states. 
Conclusions 
Our empirical  results  document  the  existence  of  convergence  in the 
sense  that  economies tend  to  grow  faster  in  per  capital terms  when 
they  are  further  below  the  steady-state  position.  This  phenomenon 
shows  up  clearly for  the  U.S.  states over  various  periods  from  1840 
to  1988.  Over  long  samples,  poor  states  tend  to  grow  faster  in  per 
capita  terms  than  rich  states  even  if  we  do  not  hold  constant  any 
variables other  than  initial per capita income  or product.  If we hold 
constant  the  region  and  measures  of  sectoral  composition,  then  the 
speed  of  convergence  appears  to  be  roughly  the  same-around  2 
percent  per year-regardless  of  the time period  or whether  we con- 
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We find evidence  of convergence  for a sample of 98 countries  from 
1960  to  1985  only  in  a  conditional  sense,  that  is,  only  if  we  hold 
constant variables such as initial school enrollment  rates and the ratio 
of government  consumption  to GDP. We interpret  these variables as 
proxies  for the steady-state  value of output  per effective  worker and 
the  rate  of  technological  progress.  If  we  hold  constant  these  addi- 
tional  variables,  then  the  estimated  rates  of  convergence  are  only 
slightly smaller  than those  found  for the U.S.  states. 
The  standard  neoclassical  growth  model  with  exogenous  techno- 
logical  progress  and  a  closed  economy  predicts  convergence.  To 
match our quantitative  estimates,  however,  we have to assume under- 
lying parameters  for preferences  and technology  that depart substan- 
tially from  usual benchmark  cases.  In particular,  for reasonable  val- 
ues  of  the  other  parameters,  the  model  requires  a  capital  share 
coefficient,  (x, in  the  neighborhood  of  .8.  Lower values  of  a,  which 
imply  that diminishing  returns  to capital set in more  quickly, imply 
-a  more  rapid rate of convergence  than that revealed  by the data. 
If  technologies  are  the  same,  then  the  introduction  of  a  global 
capital market  tends  to speed  up  the convergence  for output  but to 
slow down  the convergence  for income.  The  empirical results for the 
U.S.  states indicate  that the speed  of convergence  for output  is only 
slightly  faster  than  that  for  income.  At  this point,  we can  reconcile 
this  finding  with  the  theory  only  if  we  include  elements  of  capital 
market  imperfections,  such  as a limited  ability to borrow  to finance 
accumulations  of  human  capital.  Other  elements  of  an  open 
economy-the  mobility  of  labor and  technology-tend  to speed  up 
the predicted  rate of convergence.  Therefore,  we require even higher 
values  of  the  capital share  parameter,  (x, to match  the  empirical  re- 
sults. 
Some  recent  models  of endogenous  economic  growth,  such as Re- 
belo  (1991),  assume  constant  returns  to  a broad  concept  of  capital 
that includes  human  capital.  This  specification  corresponds  to (x = 
1.0  in  the  neoclassical  model.  As  mentioned,  our  empirical  results 
indicate  that the neoclassical  model  requires  a value of (x of about  .8 
to fit the observed  speeds  of convergence.  The  difference  between  ax 
=  .8, where  diminishing  returns to capital set in slowly, and ax  =  1.0, 
where  diminishing  returns  do not set in at all, may seem to be minor. 
But  the  difference  amounts  to a half-life  of  27  years in the  former 
case versus  infinity  in the  latter. To  put  it another  way, the conver- 
gence  coefficient  13  =  2 percent  per  year, corresponding  to ax -  .8, 
implies  that  the  poor  countries  of  sub-Saharan  Africa  should  have 
experienced  growth  of real per capita GDP from  1960 to  1985 at an 
average  rate  above  6  percent  per  year,  compared  to  2  percent  per 
year for  the  United  States, if the African countries  were approaching  the CONVERGENCE  247 
same steady-state  path as that  for  the United States. (The  actual  average 
growth rate of 0.8 percent  per year for the sub-Saharan African coun- 
tries is "explained" in the regression  in line 2 of table 3 by the addi- 
tional variables that proxy  for steady-state positions.) The  main point 
is that a value  for (x of  .8 is very far from  1.0 in an economic  sense. 
In  open-economy  versions  of  the  neoclassical  growth  model,  it is 
possible to find convergence  effects  associated with technological  dif- 
fusion  even  if  the  returns  to  capital  are  constant  (ot =  1). Also,  in 
closed-economy  models  with constant  returns  to a broad  concept  of 
capital, convergence  effects  can reflect the working  out of initial im- 
balances  among  the  various  kinds of  capital. For example,  Mulligan 
and  Sala-i-Martin  (1991)  show  that the  per capita growth  rate is in- 
versely related  to initial physical capital per worker for a given initial 
quantity  of  human  capital per worker.  Thus  we would  like to break 
down  the  observed  convergence  into  various  components:  first, ef- 
fects  related  to  diminishing  returns  to  capital  and  to  imbalances 
among  types  of  capital  in the  context  of  a closed  economy;  second, 
effects  involving  the  mobility  of  capital and labor across economies; 
and third, effects  that involve  the gradual spread of technology.  The 
present  empirical  results,  which  exploit  only  cross-sectional  differ- 
ences  in growth  rates, do  not  allow us to separate  the observed  con- 
vergence  patterns  into  these  components.  We  hope  to  make  these 
distinctions  in future  research,  which will also exploit  the time-series 
variations of  growth  rates. 
Appendix A 
Some Effects of Measurement  Error 
The regressions  shown in tables 1 and 2 can exaggerate  the estimated  conver- 
gence coefficient, I, if real income or product is measured with error. Aside 
from the usual measurement problems, one reason to expect errors is that 
we divide all nominal values in each year by a common price index. 
Equation (15) can be rewritten as 
1T  *(Yito+T)=  B  +  T  * log(yt  )  +  Uitt+T  (A  1) 
Assume that the observed value at date t, log(yt), differs from the true value, 
log(yit),  by a random measurement error: 
log(yld)  =  log(yzt) +  nit,  (A2) 
For purely temporary measurement error, nit  would be white noise. Then, 
as is well known, the measurement  error in log(yi  ,o) implied by equation (A2) 
leads to a bias toward zero in least-squares  estimation of the coefficient, 
e-T/T,  in equation (Al). Because the term  e  TIT  in equation  (Al) is decreas- 
ing in I, the nonlinear estimate I provides a corresponding  overestimate  of 
P in large samples. 248  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
We can obtain a bound for the inconsistency  induced by temporary  mea- 
surement  error. Equation  (11) implies  that the growth  rate of income between 
any two future dates, to +  T and to +  T, is given by 
1  Yizto+T\  e-  e-PT 
T -  T  ?y  )  l-  T  log(Y,7to)  +  Uito+,to+T,  (A3) 
where T >  T  >  0 and u-  t  +T  to+T depends on the error terms, uit, between 
dates to +  T and to +  T. Equation (A3) relates the growth rate from to +  T 
to to +  T to the level of per capita income or product at an earlier time, to. 
Note that equation (15) is the special case in which T  =  0. 
We assume that the measurement error, biqte  is independent of  lit,+t 
for t 2? T. This condition holds for all  T >  0 if s  is white noise but also applies 
for large enough T to measurement error with some persistence over time. 
We assume that hi tp is independent of uito+Tto+T. In this case, least-squares 
estimation of equation (A3) leads to an underestimate  of the magnitude of 
the coefficient, (ed-t  -  e-T)/(T  -  T). We can show that this term is increasing 
in I if I <  [log(T/T)]/(T-  T).  In practice, we use the values T  =  10 years 
and T  =  20 years or T  =  5 years and T =  10 years. For the first pair of 
values, the term (edit  -  e-T)/(T  -  T) is increasing  in I if I <  .07 per year; 
for the second pair, the term is increasing  in f if I < .14 per year. Therefore, 
for these ranges of I and in large samples, the underestimate  of the coeffi- 
cient on log(yito)  in equation (A3) corresponds to a large-sample  underesti- 
mate of P3.  Because this bias is opposite in direction  to that found for equation 
(15), we can use regressions in the form of equation (A3) to bound the size 
of the bias. 
Consider the regressions for personal income in which each subperiod has 
individual coefficients for the constant, three regional dummies, and the 
sectoral  composition variable,  s  it  If we use only the five equal-length  subperi- 
ods from  1930-40  to  1970-80,  then the joint estimate P in the form of 
equation (15) is .0244 (.0025), which is close to the value for nine subperiods 
from 1880 to 1988 shown in line 20 of table 1. The comparable  result in the 
form of equation (A3) with T  =  10 years and T =  20 years is I  =  .0278 
(.0049). Although we expected the asymptotic bias induced by temporary 
measurement  error to be positive in the first  case and negative in the second, 
the result for f  turns out to be higher in the second case. (The theoretical 
result can be affected by the inclusion of additional  explanatory  variables  in 
the regressions.) In any event, we infer from the similarity  of the two esti- 
mates of  P that temporary measurement error is unlikely to have a major 
influence on the results. 
For GSP, we use the three equal-length subperiods 1970-75,  1975-80, 
and  1980-85.  The joint estimate I in the form of equation (15) is .0280 
(.0058), somewhat  higher than that, .0216 (.0042), shown for four subperiods 
from 1963 to 1986 in line 11 of table 2. With  T =  5 years and T =  10 years, 
joint estimation of equation (A3) over the three subperiods from 1970 to 
1985 leads to the estimate I =  .0366 (.0091). Again, in contrast  to expecta- 
tions, the estimated  value in the second case exceeds that in the first  case. But 
the main inference is that the results are similar  and, hence, that temporary 
measurement error is unlikely to be important. CONVERGENCE  249 
Appendix B 
Key for Countries in Figures 4 and 5 
1.  Algeria 
2.  Botswana 
3.  Burundi 
4.  Cameroon 
5.  Central African  Republic 
6.  Egypt 
7.  Ethiopia 
8.  Gabon 
9.  Ghana 
10.  Ivory Coast 
11.  Kenya 
12.  Liberia 
13.  Madagascar 
14.  Malawi 
15.  Mauritius 
16.  Morocco 
17.  Nigeria 
18.  Rwanda 
19.  Senegal 
20.  Sierra Leone 
21.  South  Africa 
22.  Sudan 
23.  Swaziland 
24.  Tanzania 
25.  Togo 
26.  Tunisia 
27.  Uganda 
28.  Zaire 
29.  Zambia 
30.  Zimbabwe 
31.  Bangladesh 
32.  Burma 
33.  Hong  Kong 
34.  India 
35.  Iran 
36.  Israel 
37.  Japan 
38.  Jordan 
39.  Korea 
40.  Malaysia 
41.  Nepal 
42.  Pakistan 
43.  Philippines 
44.  Singapore 
45.  Sri Lanka 
46.  Taiwan 
47.  Thailand 
48.  Austria 
49.  Belgium 
50.  Cyprus 
51.  Denmark 
52.  Finland 
53.  France 
54.  Germany 
55.  Greece 
56.  Iceland 
57.  Ireland 
58.  Italy 
59.  Luxembourg 
60.  Malta 
61.  Netherlands 
62.  Norway 
63.  Portugal 
64.  Spain 
65.  Sweden 
66.  Switzerland 
67.  Turkey 
68.  United  Kingdom 
69.  Barbados 
70.  Canada 
71.  Costa Rica 
72.  Dominican  Republic 
73.  El Salvador 
74.  Guatemala 
75.  Haiti 
76.  Honduras 
77.  Jamaica 
78.  Mexico 
79.  Nicaragua 
80.  Panama 
81.  Trinidad  and Tobago 
82.  United  States 
83.  Argentina 
84.  Bolivia 
85.  Brazil 
86.  Chile 
87.  Colombia 
88.  Ecuador 
89.  Guyana 
90.  Paraguay 
91.  Peru 
92.  Uruguay 
93.  Venezuela 
94.  Australia 
95.  Fiji 
96.  New  Zealand 
97.  Papua New  Guinea 
98.  Indonesia 250  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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